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Which immigrant groups differ most from the cultural values held by mainstream society and why? The authors explore this question using data from the European Social Survey on the values held by almost 100,000 individuals associated with 305 immigrant groups and the native majorities of 23 countries. They test whether distant linguistic or religious origins (including in Islam), value differences that immigrants "import" from their home countries, the maintenance of transnational ties and thus diasporic cultures, or legal and social disadvantage in the country of settlement shape acculturation processes. They find that only legally or socially disadvantaged groups differ from mainstream values in significant ways. For first generation immigrants, this is because the values of their countries of origin diverge more from those of natives. Among children of disadvantaged immigrants, however, value heterodoxy emerges because acculturation processes are blocked and the values of the parent generation partially maintained. From the second generation onward, therefore, cultural values are endogenous to the formation and dissolution of social boundaries, rather than shaping these as an exogenous force.
On both sides of the Atlantic, a resurgent sociological literature points at the possible role of culture in explaining group-specific trajectories of immigration incorporation, including different levels of socioeconomic mobility ðTran 2011Þ, school success ðModood 2004; Zhou 2006Þ, deviance ðLa-grange 2010Þ, and intermarriage ðDribe and Lundh 2011Þ. However, there is no systematic empirical assessment across immigrant groups of whether the cultural orientations of both high-and low-achieving groups indeed dif-fer systematically from those of the natives of their host societies; nor is there much empirical discussion about how to explain such various levels of immigrant heterodoxy.
This article takes some first steps toward answering these questions using the European Social Survey ðESSÞ, which contains a well-established set of questions referring to the basic value orientations of individuals. The ESS allows us to identify 305 immigrant groups from all over the world who reside in 23 European countries, from Russia to Portugal and from Ireland to Turkey, and to evaluate which of these groups diverge in their value orientations from the native majorities of their countries of settlement ðor "mainstreams" for shortÞ. Whether or not such differences are responsible for group-level differences in socioeconomic mobility and whether or not such value differences are actually perceived to be relevant by immigrants and natives in their everyday boundary work will have to be explored by future research; these are not the focus on this article ðsee Waters et al. 2010Þ . Rather, we seek to explain such different degrees of immigrant divergence from national mainstream cultures. In other words, what are the correlates of value heterodoxy among immigrants and their children? We identify five theoretical arguments and evaluate them empirically on the basis of the ESS and additional data at the immigrant group level that we collected specifically for this project.
A first set of arguments emphasizes the importance of cultural differences that migrants bring with them or maintain. ð1Þ According to Berry's ð1980Þ theory of acculturation, immigrant groups who come from linguistic and religious backgrounds that are historically distant and therefore culturally disconnected from those of the natives will find it harder to adopt the values and norms of the latter. ð2Þ A related line of reasoning suggests that immigrants who hail from countries whose values differ markedly from those of the country of settlement will "import" those values (Gordon 1964) , whether or not such difference is related to remote cultural origins, as the first argument has it. ð3Þ Finally, transnationalism theory (cf. Vertovec 1999) posits that immigrants who maintain more ties with and identify more with their communities of origin will also retain the normative outlook characteristic of these origins and thus, all other things equal, remain the most distinct from the mainstream.
In contrast, a second set of arguments implies that cultural difference should be understood as a consequence, rather than cause of adaptation processes, consistent with the theory of ethnic boundary making recently developed by Wimmer ð2013Þ: legally disadvantaged or otherwise excluded immigrants start to diverge from the mainstream during and because of the nature of the incorporation process, consistent with the theory of ethnic boundary making recently developed by Wimmer (2013) independent of the cultural distance between country of origin and settlement or the dynamics of transnationalism. They do this through either of the following two mechanisms: ð4Þ Members of excluded groups proceed more slowly on the path of acculturation because they are less inclined to invest in assimilative behavior, given that they will receive fewer returns ð"blocked acculturation" in Alba and Nee 2003Þ. Alternatively, ð5Þ disadvantaged immigrants and their children may actively oppose the host society's values and norms and develop a new, oppositional culture that selectively inverts the values held dear by the natives. This article is the first to empirically evaluate these five possible arguments about which immigrant groups diverge more from cultural mainstreams and why.
The ESS contains an elaborate battery of questions on the values that individuals find worthy to pursue in their lives: altruism, individual achievement, the conservation of traditions, or the pursuit of a better life through innovation and change. By focusing on these four values, we elaborate on one particular aspect of the cultural repertoires of individuals: the schemata of goals that remain relatively constant across contexts and situations. The advantage of this operationalization of culture is that it describes a general and universal space of variation ðSchwartz 2003Þ well operationalized in the ESS survey questions, while the focus on more action-relevant and more specific behavioral norms would result in a topically narrower perspective addressed by more specialized literatures, for example, on immigrant educational styles, gender division of labor, attitudes toward homosexuality, and so forth.
We evaluate the five arguments in three different steps ðsee fig. 1Þ . In the first two steps, we use a multilevel modeling approach in which individuals are nested into immigrant minorities or national majorities, which are in turn nested into countries. The first step consists in investigating whether the proximity of cultural origins, the strength of transnational ties, or contemporary exclusion explains which immigrant groups diverge from mainstream cultural orientations. We find clear and consistent evidence in favor of the exclusion argument.
This finding is then qualified in the second step, where we differentiate between immigrants and their children to adjudicate between the exclusion and the import arguments. The findings are again quite clear-cut: "imported" cultural difference is associated with the value heterodoxy of disadvantaged immigrants, while it has no consequence for their children. With exclusion, it is the reverse: immigrants are more influenced by their country of origin values than by whether or not they are disadvantaged in their new country of destination, while the value heterodoxy of children of immigrants is exclusively accounted for by their disadvantage in the country of destination. We also briefly explore possible reverse causation problems and find that there are no strong reasons to believe that cultural difference produces exclusion rather than the other way around.
In a third step, we ask what the precise mechanisms are that lead disadvantaged children of immigrants to diverge from national mainstreams. Using a cross-nested model specification according to which individuals are simultaneously influenced by the value orientations of their parents' generation and that of their country of residence, we find no evidence whatsoever for an oppositional culture argument. Rather, our results consistently point at a process of blocked acculturation for disadvantaged children of immigrants. These findings parallel ethnographic research that shows how group pressure-by peers, parents, and communities of shared origin-prevents children of immigrants from adopting the values of a host society whose opportunities remain out of their reach.
With regard to the recent resurgence of the "culture matters" argument, we therefore make a sideward move by suggesting to first investigate which immigrant groups indeed distinguish themselves from the nonimmigrant, native population and how one could possibly explain such divergence. Since for the children of immigrants we find good evidence in favor of the disadvantage argument, we should be rather careful in as-suming that cultural orientations have an exogenous effect on such outcomes as school success or occupational mobility. This, however, is a conjecture that needs to be empirically explored by future research.
The next section briefly explores the history of studying immigrant acculturation in sociology and then details the five arguments on how to comparatively explain varying degrees of cultural heterodoxy among immigrant minorities. It also describes the variables used to evaluate these competing hypotheses as well as a series of individual-level control variables. The following section introduces the data. The next section contains the dependent variables and model specification used for steps 1 and 2, elaborates on possible measurement problems, and discusses results. The following section is dedicated to step 3. It first introduces the dependent variable and model specification and then develops an operational typology of acculturation outcomes that will help interpret the results, which are presented subsequently and triangulated with ethnographic evidence from the literature. The final section offers conclusions.
THEORIES, HYPOTHESES, AND INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
Background: The Rise, Fall, and Resurgence of Culture
In the now-classic Chicago school of thought, cultural assimilation ðor acculturation for shortÞ played an important causal role in the process of immigrant incorporation. Gordon ð1964Þ synthesized much of the prevailing scholarship into a stage theory of assimilation. Acculturation represented the first step in the process, followed by social integration, as manifested in decreased rejection by natives and increasing rates of intermarriage, upward social mobility, and finally, the identification of immigrants with the American nation ðp. 77Þ.
Attributing a causal role to cultural difference and its gradual erosion became anathema after the Moynihan report, published one year after Gordon's book, suggested that the cultural orientations of AfricanAmericans were in part responsible for their continued socioeconomic marginalization, a view that became subsequently taboo for "blaming the victim." The rise of new right-wing movements in Europe, which insisted that immigrants from distant cultures could not be assimilated into the national mainstream, had similar effects on the other side of the Atlantic. In the following decades, mainstream research on immigrant integration emphasized structural factors ðsee the overviews by Waters and Jimenez ½2005 and Heath, Rothon, and Kilpi ½2008Þ, such as an individual-level process of social mobility ðAlba and Nee 2003Þ, the context of reception with a more or less welcoming environment for specific cohorts of immigrants ðPortes and Zhou 1993Þ, or the degree of solidarity that immigrants can muster to stem the pressures of marginalization.
The new millennium rehabilitated the view that immigrant cultures play a possibly important role in processes of immigrant incorporation.
2 Many scholars now assume that ethnocultural values influence patterns of socioeconomic mobility especially of children of immigrants. Early on, some authors pointed at the self-confident optimism of immigrants ðKao and Tienda 1995Þ or their high regard for education ðFuligni 1997Þ to explain why their children did better in school than the children of native parents ðfor European findings along these lines, see Heath et al. ½2008Þ . Others maintained, more or less explicitly, that ethnocultural value systems help to explain the differences between national origin groups among children of immigrants that remain once observable parental characteristics are accounted for. Tran ð2011Þ argues, for example, that Chinese cultural values and child-rearing practices insulate children from "bad" neighborhoods ðsee Schneider and Lee ½1990 for an early review of similar arguments; for a critical assessment, see Sue and Okazaki ½1990Þ. Similarly, Zhou ð2006Þ puts the finger on the positive role that Chinese values of filial obediencethough renegotiated in the country of settlement-and the appreciation of education play in understanding these immigrants' success stories. Modood ð2004Þ offered a parallel analysis for South Asians and Chinese in Britain.
Emphasizing negative rather than positive consequences of cultures of origins, Huntington ð2004Þ warned in a general-readership book that Latinos' Catholic and Mediterranean culture was too "distant" from the Protestant cultural core of the American mainstream for them to successfully adapt over the long run ðfor an empirical critique, see Citrin et al. ½2007Þ . Meanwhile, European public intellectuals have argued forcefully that the distant cultural origins of Muslim immigrants represent a durable obstacle to their successful acculturation and social integration ðsee the inflammatory version of this argument by Sarazzin ½2010Þ. Along similar lines, Lagrange ð2010Þ argued in a hotly discussed French study that young African immigrants end up having more problems with law enforcement agencies because they are brought up, among other things, in families whose cultural orientation remains distant from that of the French mainstream. Finally, Waters ð1994, pp. 287-90, 296-302Þ showed that children of poor Caribbean immigrants who grew up in the inner city adapt to and adopt the "oppositional culture" of their black neighbors and settle into a life of few opportunities, while their suburban coethnics of middle-class background cling to an identity as Dominicans, Haitians, or Trinidadians and to the immigrant ethos of their parents.
While varying considerably in their theoretical framing and political pitch, these different studies all raise the same empirical question: Which immigrant groups actually do differ systematically from the national mainstream culture, whether or not such divergence subsequently shows positive or negative effects on the prospects of upward social mobility or acceptance by natives? It seems that much existing research assumes, rather than actually demonstrates, that its antecedent assumptions hold: that Chinese immigrants or Russian Jews indeed differ more from a national mainstream than do, for example, British immigrants in the United States; that African immigrants in France are "more different" from native French culture than are Italians; and so forth.
Correspondingly, assuming that immigrant cultures shape integration trajectories raises a second question that will represent the focus of this study: How do we comparatively understand why certain immigrant groups diverge more from the national mainstream than others? Is culture an exogenous force, brought with immigrants from their countries of origin? Or is it rather shaped by the incorporation process itself and is thus an endogenous element of different acculturation trajectories? In the following we introduce the answers suggested by the literature and discuss with which variables contained in the ESS we intend to evaluate them.
Proximity of Cultural Origins
Many laypersons would find the argument put forward by social psychologist John Berry ð1980, 1997Þ quite plausible: Acculturation is more likely, he suggested, if the "cultural distance" between majority and minority is small ð1997, p. 23; see also Hoffmann-Nowotny 1992Þ. Cultural distance is defined as the degree to which the linguistic and religious traditions of host and home cultures are historically related to each other. Such historical familiarity would make it easier to adopt the values of the host society, leading to the following hypothesis: HYPOTHESIS 1.-Different degrees of historical proximity between cultures of origin and destination should explain contemporary levels of value heterodoxy among immigrants groups.
To illustrate: an ðex-Þ Confucian immigrant of Chinese mother tongue should remain more distant from French mainstream culture than a fellow ðex-Þ Catholic who speaks another Latin language such as Italian. For the sake of terminological clarity, we call this the "proximity of cultural origins" argument.
We operationalize the proximity of linguistic origins as the number of nodes in the phylogenetic language tree that separates immigrant from ma-jority languages ðfollowing Fearon ½2003Þ. This measurement thus counts the number of historical language innovations ðgiving rise to a new branch in the treeÞ that one would have to reverse in order to speak the same language. We code historical proximity with reference to the majority language spoken in the country of origin, unless we had indications ðfrom the surveyÞ that most of the immigrants were members of a specific linguistic minority, as was the case for Russian return migrants from Central Asian countries, for example. Although the language proximity measure is continuous in principle, graphical analysis revealed that the distribution has three distinct modes. Consequently, we grouped the proximity of linguistic origins into four categories.
According to a similar logic of historical filiation, we code proximity of religious origins into five dummy variables. Following Inglehardt's lead, we code divisions within Western Christianity ði.e., Catholics vs. ProtestantsÞ 1, while two groups adhering to the same religion received a 0. The distance between Western and Orthodox Christianity is coded 2 and that between Islam and Christianity 3. The distance between historically unrelated religions that do not share any prophets or gods, such as Christianity on the one hand and non-Abrahamic religions such as Hinduism and Confucianism on the other hand, received a distance code of 4.
Since this is a group-level variable, we disregard the fact that many individual group members are thoroughly secularized ðespecially in Eastern EuropeÞ, a variation that is adequately captured through the individuallevel coding of religiosity ðsee belowÞ. In cases in which immigrant groups or majorities were of mixed religious background, we refer to the most common religion among group members. These codings of the proximity of linguistic and religious origins obviously represent rough proxies but capture the general logic of Berry's argument reasonably well.
We also coded each person's religious faith at the individual level, which allows us to test whether actual adherence to a specific belief system-rather than just hailing from a country that is shaped by such a system-is indeed associated with significant deviations from mainstream values. More specifically, this allows us to test the Islamic exceptionalism argument in a more direct way.
Cultural Import Following Gordon's line of reasoning, one could argue that cultural difference is largely imported from countries of origin, independent of how closely the languages and religions of these countries are historically related to those of the country of settlement. What matters is how different country of origin and country of destination cultures actually are, whether or not this has anything to do with the historical proximity of languages and religions. Also in line with Gordon, one could argue that discrimination by natives and their government closely follows these cultural differences. 3 In other words, rejection by natives is a function of how far they perceive immigrants to conform to locally established norms of appropriate behavior and propriety ðfor an ethnographic example, see Wimmer ½2004Þ. For brevity, we call this the "cultural import" hypothesis:
HYPOTHESIS 2.-Immigrants from countries whose values, on average, differ most from those of the average of the country of settlement will remain the most heterodox.
Note that this hypothesis is far from trivial because it makes value formation entirely dependent on the original distance between country-specific value universes, thus disregarding assimilation processes and different possible acculturation paths of immigrants who are received differently by a host society.
In order to test this cultural import argument, we can code value differences between countries directly because many immigrants hail from one of the countries covered by the ESS. This allows calculating differences between "mainstream" value orientations in country of origin and country of destination. Obviously, we need to exclude immigrant groups from the rest of the world from this analysis ðe.g., Algerians in France, Americans in the United KingdomÞ, and we also cannot take possible selectivity effects into account: Turkish migrants in Western Europe, for example, might originate from regions and social milieus within Turkey that do not correspond to that country's average. Still, roughly half of the immigrant groups hail from other ESS countries, and we thus can evaluate the cultural import argument with a reasonably large and diverse sample.
Exclusion: Blocked Acculturation or Oppositional Culture
One could also reverse the causal arrow and put the finger on contemporary processes of exclusion and discrimination as generators of cultural differ-3 Gordon's argument was more complex, in at least two ways. First, with regard to his definition of "culture," he distinguished "intrinsic cultural traits," such as religious beliefs and patterns, musical tastes, recreational patterns, etc., from extrinsic culture, such as "the volatility of emotional expression of the Southern and Eastern European peasant or villagers as compared to the reserve of the upper-middle class American. Or the variant speech patterns, or argot, of the lower-class Negro of recent southern background" ðGordon 1964, p. 80Þ. Values and norms are part of "intrinsic" culture at the core of the acculturation process, while "extrinsic" cultural practices were more likely to affect levels of rejection by natives because they were more directly experienced in everyday interactions. Second, and with regard to the causal link between cultural difference and discrimination, Gordon remarked that extreme forms of geographic isolation, as among American Indians, or of discrimination, as against African-Americans, might retard the acculturation process. However, this was in no way causally effective: "This effect of ence. At the most general level, the idea is that the lack of contact and durable social relationships across an ethnic boundary-as is the case with discriminating and discriminated groups-will make it difficult to coordinate around shared norms and behavioral expectations ðColeman 1990, chap. 11; from a different theoretical angle, see Deutsch ½1953Þ, thus leading to an increasing differentiation of the cultural universes inhabited by members of both groups ðWimmer 2008, 2013Þ. The general hypothesis derived from the exclusion approach is the following:
HYPOTHESIS 3.-Groups that are legally or socially disadvantaged by a host society will differ more from mainstream values than nondisadvantaged groups.
Two distinct mechanisms have been proposed in the more specific literature on immigrant incorporation that could explain the association between exclusion and cultural difference. First, Alba and Nee ð2003, pp. 277-78Þ suggested, as part of their neo-assimilationist, now more individualist and rationalist approach, that members of discriminated against groups remain different from national mainstreams because the process of acculturation is "blocked." Entry into the mainstream expands opportunities of individuals; pursuing these opportunities, immigrants will take actions that, intentionally or not, will lead to cultural assimilation. But individuals will choose these assimilatory strategies only if success is predictable. That is, there must be some confidence that "investments" in social mobility, which may then in turn lead to acculturation, will pay off. Absence of high levels of discrimination is a condition for that. "Consequently," Alba and Nee write, "our theory emphasizes the institutional mechanisms that ensure predictability and the role of the state in maintaining an institutional environment in which the civil rights of minorities are safeguarded and barriers to entry imposed by racism have been lowered ðalbeit not eliminatedÞ" ðp. 278Þ. This approach leads to the following prediction:
HYPOTHESIS 4.-Home country values of disadvantaged groups will be maintained to a larger degree than those of nondiscriminated groups.
Second, one could also argue, inspired by a long debate on the role of culture in understanding the poor educational performance of AfricanAmericans ðFordham and Ogbu 1986; Small and Newman 2001; Harris 2011Þ , that immigrants subject to discrimination actively reject the mainstream culture from which they remain excluded. Rather than clinging to their home country culture, as in the blocked acculturation model, they thus discrimination will be seen to have been a delaying action only; the quantitatively significant emerging of the middle-class Negro is well on its way" ðp. 78Þ. Cultural difference, as other passages make clear as well, is mostly seen as a cause of discrimination and not its effect.
develop new cultural patterns that explicitly negate those of the mainstream: When puritan work ethics are emphasized by the natives, a culture of sophisticated leisure is developed ðor the other way aroundÞ; when mainstreamers insist on tidiness and order, improvisation and the aesthetics of assemblage might emerge as core values ðor the other way aroundÞ. Excluded immigrants should therefore be negatively influenced by both the country of destination values ðwhich they rejectÞ and those of their origin countries, which they perceive as inappropriate to deal with the situation of continued exclusion. A two-sided hypothesis expresses this idea:
HYPOTHESIS 5.-Disadvantaged immigrant groups differ more both from country of origin values and from mainstream values than do nondisadvantaged groups.
To test these two exclusion hypotheses, we need to determine levels of disadvantage for different immigrant groups. 4 For matters of traceability and in line with the theories to be evaluated ðe.g., Alba and Nee 2003, p. 278Þ, we focus mainly on legal forms of exclusion. We define exclusion/ disadvantage as a series of legally enforced barriers in access to citizenship, labor markets, and social rights. We coded as "excluded" all those country of origin groups that do not have privileged access to citizenship or full labor market and social rights, in contrast to citizens of European Union countries ðwho enjoy local voting rights, full equality in terms of social rights and employment, etc.Þ and in contrast to coethnic return migrants who are immediately granted full citizenship in some countries ðRussian Aussiedler in Germany, Bulgarian Turks in Turkey, Russian return migrants from Central Asia, and so onÞ and to certain categories of ex-colonial migrants with privileged access to labor markets and citizenship of the former colonial center ðmostly Spanish Latin Americans in SpainÞ.
For these ex-colonial migrants, we added another criterion, coding as "disadvantaged" all those who can be identified as racially different, even if 4 A third exclusion argument refers to a "culture of mobility" as a point of reference for immigrant acculturation ðNeckerman, Carter, and Lee 1999; Vallejo 2012Þ rather than the mainstream ðas in Alba's neoassimilationist theoryÞ or the urban underclass ðas in segmented assimilation theoryÞ. Such a culture emerged, it is argued, among existing middle-class enclaves of immigrant origin, whose members have developed specific strategies to counter discrimination by natives in integrated neighborhoods and workplaces as well as to handle the demands of solidarity of their less fortunate coethnics. Upon closer reading of this literature, it turns out that this "culture" consists of participating in professional organizations for minorities as well as the broader community and its organizations and in maintaining ties with and fluency in the behavioral and linguistic styles of lower-class community members. In other words, the "culture of mobility" does not seem to comprise specific value orientations that we seek to study in this article. Nevertheless, we can note here that, empirically, we did not find that the acculturation paths differ between college-educated and other children of disadvantaged immigrants, as the culture of mobility argument implies. they enjoy privileged access to citizenship. Thus, Argentinians in Spain were not, while Bolivians in Spain were coded as "disadvantaged" ðfor evidence of racial discrimination experienced in Spain among Latin Americans of mixed racial background, see Flores ½2013; for non-Europeans in France, see Simon ½2012, p. 14; for the "ethnic penalty" on European labor markets paid by immigrants and their children from developing countries, see Heath et al. ½2008Þ . Note that this coding is specific for each country dyad: Argentinians in Spain are coded differently from Argentinians in France and Algerians in France differently from those who settled in Great Britain; Russians in Ukraine received a different coding than Russians in England, and so forth.
Beyond the Assimilation Framework: Transnationalism and Hybridity
These various strands of thinking on immigrant acculturation remain tied to an assimilationist point of view, describing immigrants' cultural orientations in terms of more or less conformity to mainstream cultures and values. In recent decades, new trends have emerged. Many authors have maintained that the assimilation paradigm overlooked that contemporary immigrants no longer live in a single societal context-that of their country of settlement-but instead remain inserted in country-of-origin contexts through repeated backand-forth travels, sustained contact with family and friends back home, cheap phone calls and Internet communication, business and other investments in home communities, and the maintenance of cultural practices, values, and norms of their communities of origin ðe.g., Faist 1998; Vertovec 1999; Levitt 2001; Smith 2005Þ . In extreme cases of transnational orientation, individuals therefore remain immersed over generations in stable diasporic cultures oriented toward a distant homeland ðfor an overview, see Brubaker ½2005Þ.
HYPOTHESIS 6.-An observable implication of this transnationalism literature is that immigrants who maintain more ties to their countries of origin should be less likely to adopt the mainstream value orientations in countries of settlement and thus remain more heterodox.
It is rather difficult to evaluate this hypothesis empirically since the ESS was not designed to explore immigration issues and contains no questions on transnational practices. We use two proxy variables that might influence the strength of home ties: the kilometer distance between settlement and origin country, which should reduce the frequency of back-and-forth travel and visits, and a variable that asks how frequently a person uses the Internet for personal purposes ðproducing an ordinal scale reaching from "never" to "daily"Þ, which should make the maintenance of transnational ties and cultural orientations easier.
Some anthropologists, political philosophers, and qualitative sociologists have employed a different theoretical move to avoid the normative and empirical orientation of traditional research on the mainstream repre-sented by native-born citizens. They emphasize the individual creativity of immigrants who combine and blend elements of divergent cultural traditions that they find among the variety of immigrant and native groups in their neighborhoods. They describe the outcome of such processes of mixture and recombination variously as "creole cultures" ðHannerz 1987Þ, "hybridity" ðBhabha 1995; see also Werbner and Modood 1997Þ, "new ethnicities" ðHall 1996Þ, "local cosmopolitanism" ðHiebert 2002Þ, or "super-diversity" ðVertovec 2007Þ. We will not be able to empirically evaluate this perspective since it would demand information on locally specific population compositions in order to assess whether immigrants indeed combine and blend locally available values from different immigrant and native groups. The immigrant samples in the ESS are too small to allow for such a fine-grained analysis. The hybridity perspective also implies, however, that neither the values of countries of origin nor those of the mainstream shape immigrants' normative orientations in clear-cut ways. Hybridity theory thus offers an alternative language to describe an acculturation outcome that in the standard terminology of assimilation theories remains difficult to grasp.
Individual-Level Factors
So far, we have discussed a series of arguments that could influence the degree to which and the manner in which immigrant groups diverge from the mainstreams of their host society. The formation of values is, obviously, influenced by other factors as well that are unrelated to immigration and the group-specific value orientations we focused on so far. We consider the most important individual-level variables that past research has uncovered. We include these variables both to control for compositional differences across immigrant groups and to comparatively assess the relative magnitude of possible group-level effects.
We know that gender is associated with value orientation. Most studies find that women value altruism, compassion, sociality, and self-direction more than do men ðsee the summary in Hitlin and Piliavin ½2004, pp. 369-70Þ. Age is associated with whether or not individuals hold mainstream values and which absolute values they embrace, with the usual difficulty of disentangling cohort effects ðe.g., of experiencing World War II or CommunismÞ from the effects of aging. Family status can also be associated with value orientations. Individuals who never had children ðand thus deviate from modal patterns of family formationÞ may conform less to mainstream values, whether through selection or adaptation mechanisms, and be less altruistic and more conservative in terms of absolute values.
Past research also shows that religiosity matters for the values individuals hold. Alwin's ð1986Þ study of Catholics and Protestants in the United States found that denominational differences are less important for under-standing values than religiosity. Survey research in Israel, Germany, Spain, the Netherlands, and Greece arrived at similar results ðSchwartz and Huismans 1995Þ. The religiosity variable in the ESS is based on self-assessment and is coded on a 10-point scale. We expect religious individuals to be more conservative and more altruistic.
We also include three variables related to socioeconomic background and current status of an individual. First, we include the number of years an individual spent in school. The educational system shapes value orientations through both socialization and sorting mechanisms. The national school system, designed to inculcate mainstream middle-class values into the population, rewards the corresponding behavioral and normative dispositions and selects more conformist individuals for higher-level educational trajectories ðBourdieu and Passeron 1990Þ. Individuals with many years of schooling should therefore be more conformist-that is, adhere more closely to mainstream values-than those with fewer years of schooling. In absolute terms, well-educated individuals will be less conservative and more open to change as well as more individual achievement motivated and less altruistic and community oriented.
Second, a long line of research in the wake of Kohn's seminal studies has shown that different occupational positions-operationalized through whether or not they imply a supervisory function, the complexity of tasks, and the degree of routinization of work-are associated with value orientations ðsee the summary in Hitlin and Piliavin ½2004, pp. 370-71Þ. We therefore include a dummy variable measuring whether an individual supervises others in the workplace and thus forms part of the managerial class. According to Kohn, those who are supervised at work should hold more conservative values, because the very nature of their jobs allows for less self-direction in the execution of everyday tasks, while those supervising others should value individual achievement more.
Third, inherited cultural capital should influence individual value orientations. Individuals who grew up in academic households-whose parents have acquired a postgraduate degree-are raised in a milieu that emphasizes individuality over conformity and creativity and playfulness over the mastery of cultural orthodoxies ðBourdieu 1984Þ. In other words, heterodoxy becomes a marker of distinction meant to differentiate the culturally resourceful from the less educated families-even of similar economic standing. In conformity with this, we expect individuals whose parents have reached a tertiary education to hold values that diverge from the mainstream values of the majority population. 5 In absolute terms, children of academically trained parents are expected to be less conservative and more open to change and more oriented toward individual achievement motivations. A series of dummies capture father's education ðprimary, secondary, and tertiaryÞ to take these effects into account. Descriptive statistics on these various variables can be found in Appendix Table 1 . The data source is discussed next.
DATA Immigrants and Natives in the European Social Survey
For all individual level variables, we rely on the European Social Survey, a standardized survey administered in more than 30 European countries and Israel. 6 The ESS uses representative samples with full coverage of the eligible residential populations age 15 and above. While the survey was not specifically designed to study immigration, pooling four waves ðbetween 2000 and 2006Þ of the ESS provides a sufficient number of individuals with an immigrant background for our analysis. The disadvantage of not having more immigration-related questions and no oversample of immigrants is outweighed, in our view, by the possibility of studying a very large number of groups in a considerable number of countries, thus for the first time allowing us to assess various theories of immigrant acculturation in a systematic way.
To identify immigrants and their children, we rely on answers to countryof-origin questions regarding the respondent ðfirst-generation immigrantsÞ and her parents ðchildren of immigrantsÞ. We sometimes also used language spoken at home, religion, or both to exclude members of the dominant majority who returned from former colonies, such as the French pied noirs from Algeria, who need to be distinguished from Muslim Algerian immigrants.
For each country, we defined the largest nonimmigrant ethnic group as the reference group ðor "mainstream"Þ to which the values of immigrant minorities are compared in the first two steps of our analysis. Usually this is the dominant majority with which the state is identified: Turkish-speaking Muslims in Turkey, French speakers whose parents were both born in France, German speakers without immigrant background in Germany, and so forth. We excluded from the majority group any respondents who stated that they belonged to an ethnic minority group or considered themselves part of a nonmajority religious denomination ðe.g., Islam or Eastern Orthodoxy in FranceÞ. For multinational states such as Switzerland and Belgium, the largest domestic ethnic group was defined as the mainstream ðGerman-speaking Swiss and Flemish-speaking BelgiansÞ. The majority 6 We use only the 23 countries that have a significant number of immigrant respondents. These include Ukraine, Turkey, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden, Russia, Portugal, Norway, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Ireland, Hungary, Greece, Great Britain, France, Finland, Spain, Denmark, Germany, Czech Republic, Switzerland, Belgium, and Austria; we exclude Israel from consideration here. reference group is thus composed of all individuals who do not speak any language other than the dominant national languageðsÞ at home, were not born abroad and had both parents born in the country as well, did not adhere to a nondominant religion, and did not report being discriminated against as a minority.
7 After we dropped observations with missing values, this procedure yielded a total sample of about 97,000 individuals in 23 countries, of which about 9,700 are associated with 305 immigrant minorities.
The number of immigrant groups by country varies widely, from one in the Czech Republic to 35 in Sweden. To illustrate that we are not exclusively dealing with European migrants in other European countries, we list the immigrant groups that we coded for Switzerland: those from neighboring countries ðGermany, France, Austria, ItalyÞ; from other European countries ðAlbania, Belgium, Bosnia, the United Kingdom, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Hungary, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Russia, Serbia, Slovenia, and SpainÞ; and from non-European origins ðBrazil, Canada, China, Latin America, Muslim Arabs, Sri Lanka, sub-Saharan Africa, Turkey, and the United StatesÞ. As this list illustrates, we grouped individuals from similar backgrounds, such as all Muslims from majority-Arab countries of the Middle East or sub-Saharan Africans, into one category if group sizes would otherwise have been too small. This produced a total of 12 such "synthetic" groups.
Values
The ESS contains 21 value questions, developed by Shalom Schwartz. This series of questions was previously applied in 40 surveys in 20 countries before it was integrated into the ESS. Its developers are confident ðSchwartz 1992Þ that it represents a well-suited tool for empirically grasping something as notoriously ephemeral and difficult to study as human values and that the questions are meaningful across cultural contexts ðfor a discussion of some remaining methodological problems of studying values with surveys, see Hitlin and Piliavin ½2004, pp. 365-68Þ.
Subjects were asked how far they identify with a fictitious person who holds a specific value, using a six-point Likert-type scale. This fictitious person thinks, for example, "that people should follow rules at all times, even when no one is watching." These 21 questions load on 10 subvalues, which in turn cluster into four major values that are labeled conservation, openness ðfavoring change and innovationÞ, self-enhancement ðreferring mostly to individual achievement valuesÞ, and self-transcendence ðreferring mostly to altruistic orientationsÞ. The four values align along two dimensions, as described by Davidov, Schmidt, and Schwartz ð2008Þ: "The self-enhancement versus self-transcendence dimension opposes power and achievement values-that emphasize self-interest-to universalism and benevolence values-that entail concern for the welfare and interests of others. The openness to change versus conservation dimension opposes self-direction and stimulation values-that emphasize independent action, thought, and feeling and readiness for new experience-to security, conformity, and traditional values-that emphasize self-restriction, order, and resistance to change" ðpp. 424-25Þ. 8 We note here that a large body of scholarship has shown that these values are associated with real behavioral practices. In other words, they are relevant not only for how individuals think about what are relevant goals to achieve in life but also for how they act in the world. Schwartz 
Defining Heterodoxy
We use Schwartz's value scales to construct our dependent variables. For assessing the relative importance of exclusion, the import of value difference, and the proximity of linguistic and religious origins, as we do in the first two steps, we define the distance from the mean values held by mainstream individuals as the dependent variable ðor "heterodoxy" for shortÞ. In this analysis, we therefore do not care about the direction of value heterodoxy-whether an individual is more or less conservative than the national 8 For a detailed description of all the questions and value dimensions, including a summary of the development of the scale, see Davidov et al. ð2008Þ . Here are some examples of questions and the values they express. For openness to change: "Thinking up new ideas and being creative is important to him. He likes to do things in his own original way." For conservation: "It is important to him always to behave properly. He wants to avoid doing anything people would say is wrong." For self-enhancement: "It is important to him to be rich. He wants to have a lot of money and expensive things." For self-transcendence: "It is important to him to be loyal to his friends. He wants to devote himself to people close to him." majority, for example-but only about the absolute magnitude of such deviance from the mainstream. Heterodoxy is thus defined as the absolute distance of an individual's value orientation from the mean of the national "mainstream." To arrive at a single measurement, we summed the distance regarding all four major values, thus producing a Manhattan distance. Figure 2 helps to illustrate this. The acculturation of individual X is calculated as jAj 1 jBj 1 jCj 1 jDj. We ran all models with individual values as dependent variables as well and note divergent results in footnotes.
Possible Measurement Problems
The bases of our dependent variables are the factor scores, which we obtain from a confirmatory factor analysis using the categorical data robust maximum likelihood routines implemented in M-Plus ðMuthén and Muthén 2007Þ. When using cross-national survey data, one needs to worry whether the underlying latent variables are measured consistently across units of observation. It may well be that immigrants and natives understand the same questions about values in different, culturally specific ways. In the survey literature, this is called the problem of "measurement invariance," of which there are different levels.
In order to meaningfully compare means between immigrant groups and natives within countries, as we do in the first two steps of the analysis, "scalar invariance" must be met: differences in the answer patterns must be related to differences in the means of the underlying variables and not simply emerge from different understandings of the questions. Testing scalar
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Blocked Acculturation 163 invariance for each immigrant group was not possible since the sample size for some groups is too small. Instead, we tested for each country and for each of the four value dimensions whether we find scalar invariance between the majority and all immigrant groups combined. 9 Out of 92 such tests, only for two did we find indications of lack of scalar invariance ðboth cases were in BelgiumÞ. Yet even in these cases, we still find partial scalar invariance, which is sufficient for comparing means ðSteenkamp and Baumgartner 1998Þ. Note that for our research design, it does not matter that measurement invariance across countries is not given, according to Davidov ð2008Þ, since we never compare answers across countries. In the third step of our analysis, the focus of the following section, we will analyze the relative influence of country/group-level values. For this kind of research design, a lower standard of invariance called "metric invariance" must be met. There are no problems with metric invariance, as Davidov shows.
A second possible bias relates to differential response rates among immigrants dependent on language skills and thus perhaps also levels of acculturation. Indeed, Idema and Phalet ð2007Þ show that more linguistically assimilated Turks in Germany hold more egalitarian gender values. This means that all our estimates are biased toward finding fewer value differences between immigrants and natives than one would if immigrants had been interviewed in their own native languages. Since there are no baseline data on the distribution of language abilities among the immigrant population of all countries, we cannot correct this bias using weighting techniques. All our findings thus tend to err on the conservative side, and we should therefore be more confident in the levels of significance that the models indicate.
Modeling Approach
In the first two steps of the analysis, we nest individuals ðiÞ in ethnic groups ð jÞ who are in turn nested within countries ðkÞ. Explanatory variables are situated at both the individual and the group levels. We examine which variables are associated with an individual's proximity to or distance from a country's mainstream value orientations, using a linear mixed-effects model. More precisely, the mean of the dependent variable-that is, the measure of value distance for individual i in ethnic group j and country k-is represented by a vector of individual-level predictors, an intercept that varies by country, and the effect of a dummy variable that indicates whether or not the indi-9 Specifically, we use ordered categorical data analysis multiple-group confirmatory factor analysis ðCFAÞ in M-Plus ðMillsap and Tein 2004Þ. In a few countries where response categories were missing for one of the groups and we therefore could not use categorical data analysis, we opted for standard multiple group CFA. vidual belongs to a minority group in that country. We model the effect of this dummy variable using a vector of group-level independent variables. We are not interested, however, in explaining differences between countries and thus do not introduce country-specific variables. This model is estimated using the lme4 package in R ðBates and Maechler 2010Þ.
Results of
Step 1: Proximity of Cultural Origins, Transnational Ties, or Exclusion?
We are now ready to discuss the results of the first step of the analysis, which consists in exploring whether distant historical origins, transnational ties, or legal disadvantage is more closely associated with immigrant value heterodoxy. Table 1 lists the estimates of a model with the summed value distance that separates an individual from the mainstream of her country of residence as a dependent variable. The model includes both members of a majority and immigrant minorities. We find that many individual-level control variables are associated with value heterodoxy in the expected ways. Since this is not the focus of interest, we discuss this only briefly here.
Men hold more orthodox values than women, value orthodoxy decreases with age ðthough the effect is very smallÞ, large-city dwellers are less conformist, and religious individuals conform more to mainstream values. Years of education are strongly and negatively associated with heterodoxy: the more schooling, the more an individual holds mainstream values. The effect levels off slightly, as the significance of the squared education term indicates. Individuals who inherited much cultural capital are more heterodox than others, as expected: father's tertiary education is negatively associated with value conformity. Again as expected, those who supervise others at work hold more mainstream values than do subordinates.
With regard to the theories at the core of this article, table 1 shows that only one of the variables measuring the historical proximity of religious and linguistic origins reaches standard levels of significance. But the sign of the coefficient goes in the direction opposite of what was expected: migrants from Hindu or Confucian backgrounds ðreligious distance 4Þ are significantly less heterodox than those from the same religious tradition as the mainstream. There is thus no support for the idea that immigrant groups who hail from more remote cultural origins-who speak very different languages or whose religions have few historical connections with those of the natives-acculturate less into national mainstreams.
For religious distance 3, which refers to Muslim minorities in Christian countries, the coefficient is far from statistically significant at conventional levels. Furthermore, individuals who actually identified themselves as believing Muslims ðan individual-level variableÞ are not more or less heterodox than Catholics, the omitted category of the individual-level religion variables ðthis result remains substantially the same if we exclude grouplevel religion variables from the equationÞ. Rather, secular individuals who reported not belonging to any religion diverge more from the mainstream. If anything, therefore, there is a cultural divide between secular and religious individuals in contemporary Europe rather than between Christians and Muslims. If neither migrants from Muslim countries residing in Christian countries nor, more generally, individual Muslim believers differ significantly from national mainstreams, we have to doubt that the religious doctrine of Islam is indeed associated with a different set of basic value orientations, as maintained by Inglehart and Baker ð2000Þ, Pagden ð2009Þ, and many observers of Muslim immigrant integration in the West ðSarazzin 2010Þ. One might, of course, find such differences when looking at more specific normative orientations such as regarding gender roles.
10 But our findings demonstrate that if there is a difference between Islamic and Christian moral universes at all, it must be with regard to such specific values rather than the broader cultural orientations that we are trying to understand in this article-a conjecture that future research might further evaluate.
We also do not find consistent support for the idea that immigrants who are more likely to maintain transnational ties to their origin communities remain more distant from mainstream values of the country of settlement: neither the geographic proximity to the country of origin ðmeasured in kilometersÞ nor the frequent personal use of the Internet-which both should facilitate upholding transnational ties to communities of origin-is associated with value heterodoxy.
However, legally disadvantaged immigrants clearly are those who diverge from national mainstreams in significant ways. To illustrate, groups that diverge very strongly from their respective national mainstreams ðand in statistically significant waysÞ include Central Americans, Sri Lankans, Syrians, Turks and Iranians in Sweden, South Africans and other Africans in Ireland, Bosnians in Luxembourg, Algerians in Spain, Iraqis and Russians in Norway, and Chinese in France. This relationship between disadvantage and heterodoxy is of course probabilistic: some disadvantaged groups such as Turks in Germany do not differ from the mainstream, while some nondisadvantaged immigrants such as Swedes in the United Kingdom do.
11 It is also noticeable that the main effect of the immigrant group dummy is not significant: immigrant groups that are not legally excluded ðnor from linguistically and religiously distant originsÞ do not diverge, on average, more from mainstream values than do natives.
Results of Step 2: Imported Difference or Exclusion?
In the second step of the analysis, we evaluate the cultural import argument and determine whether disadvantaged immigrants simply hail from countries with the most distinct value orientations. In other words, is it the "import" of cultural difference by migrants from countries with distinctively different values that explains levels of value heterodoxy rather than disadvantage itself? Could it even be that immigrant groups are discriminated against because they come from culturally distinct countries?
Endogeneity issues.-To disentangle the exclusion from the import mechanism, we first need to address this problem of the direction of causality. At first sight, there is some support for the conjecture that legal disadvantage could be the consequence rather than the cause of value difference: the average values in the countries of origin of disadvantaged groups indeed differ more from those of the destination countries than those of nondiscriminated groups ðresults not shownÞ. However, it is quite unlikely that this is due to a causal relationship: countries do not grant equal treatment before the law to immigrants who are most likely to share the values of their own citizens. Rather, equal treatment depends on considerations of political and economic expediency ðmost notably related to the EU enlargement processÞ, shared democratic modes of governance or levels of economic development ðand, thus, of emigration propensitiesÞ, or historical affinities with returning coethnics ðas with German Aussiedlers, Muslim Pomaks who are admitted to Turkey, or the privileging of Latin American "return" migrants in SpainÞ.
We preliminarily explore this conjecture with a logit regression that takes immigrant minorities as units of observation. Being discriminated against ðor notÞ serves as a dichotomous dependent variable. Value differences between country of origin and settlement are not associated with the chances of being excluded, as soon as we control for differences in economic development, literacy levels, levels of democratization, and population size between the two countries ðresults not shownÞ. Only the differences in levels of democratization remain significant in such an integrated model. This analysis is obviously rather crude.
12 Only a much larger sample of countries and longitudinal data over decades would allow us to address the endogeneity question in a fully satisfactory way. Still, we found two additional ways to evaluate the exclusion hypothesis with the given data, thus increasing the confidence in our causal interpretation. First, we reduced the sample to country of origin groups ðn520Þ whose status is disadvantaged in some countries of settlement but not in some others and who have at least 5 individuals in each. We then calculated the difference in value heterodoxy, as in table 1, averaging this measure over all groups in this subsample. We find that an immigrant group is, on average, 0.18 more heterodox ðmean SD 5 .10Þ in countries where it is disadvantaged compared to where it is not-in line with the estimate we show in table 1. This research design does not take into account, however, that countries in which immigrants are disadvantaged might also be those whose value differ more from those of immigrants.
Second, and in order to overcome this limitation, we estimated a model of all migrants and their children with fixed effects for both sending and receiving countries as well as a dummy variable indicating a status of disadvantage. The result is again in line with out original estimate: disadvantage is associated with about 0.16 ðt-statistic 1.87Þ more heterodoxy. This model effectively controls for all unobserved characteristics of both origin groups and countries of settlement at the same time-and thus allows showing the effects of disadvantage independent of possible confounding mechanisms related to group or country of settlement specifics, including in how far their citizens diverged, on average, in their values before migration.
Import of cultural difference and exclusion: A generational view.-If value difference does not produce legal disadvantage, but rather the other way around as the above suggests, we still need to properly disentangle exclusion from cultural import because discriminated-against migrants hail from countries whose value orientations happen to differ more. Maybe the net effect of such import is larger than of the exclusion mechanism-even if we showed above that this latter is significant after controlling for the former? And more importantly: Maybe the analyses above mask important differences between immigrant generations? Maybe the import mechanism operates more strongly for the first generation of immigrants who remain tied to their cultural origins? Table 2 adjudicates between the import and the exclusion argument with two models, one for the generation of immigrants and the other one for their children. The dependent variable in all models is again defined as the cumulative divergence from mainstream means on all four value dimensions. Individual-level controls are the same as before but are omitted from the table.
Each model contains two submodels: one for immigrants and their descendants from around the world and the second one only for those groups that who hailed from one of the countries in which the ESS was administered. For this second group of countries, we can calculate the difference ðagain summed over all four value dimensionsÞ between the values of country of origin and of destination-the value difference, in other words, that immigrants "bring with them" according to the import perspective on immigrant acculturation. Since the number of sending countries included in this second set of models is rather small and because eliminating a large number of non-European migrants severely limits variation, these results should be interpreted as indicative rather than conclusive.
Model 1 for the first generation shows that without controlling for origin value difference, immigrants who are legally disadvantaged ðrepresented by the interaction termÞ diverge from mainstream values in significant ways while nonexcluded immigrants are statistically indistinguishable from the mainstream ðthe main effectÞ. The coefficient for exclusion is relatively large: more than twice that of gender.
Model 2 refers to the subsample of immigrants from ESS countries for which we can calculate the origin value difference. Taking into account that discriminated-against immigrants hail from countries with more different values changes the picture quite a bit: now excluded immigrant groups no longer diverge from the mainstream, while those hailing from origin countries with very different values do so. In short, we find support for the import perspective for the first generation. Model 3 refers to children of immigrants. Both discriminated-against and nondiscriminated-against groups diverge from mainstream values in significant ways, but discriminated groups are almost twice as far removed from the mainstream as nondiscriminated ones. Turning to model 4, we again reduce the sample to migrants from ESS countries and now take the origin value difference into account. It shows no effect whatsoever on children of immigrants, meaning that groups whose parents came from countries with very different value orientations do not diverge more from the mainstream than those whose parents' countries show very similar values. But legal disadvantage has a substantially very strong and statistically significant effect: children of discriminated-against immigrants diverge from mainstreams as much as individuals with 8.5 years less schooling than the average.
We conclude that both an import and an exclusion perspective are supported by the analysis, but each for a different generation of migrants. Not surprisingly, unless one assumes that we change values as easily as our clothes, first-generation immigrants continue to be shaped by the values of their countries of origin ðin line with more general research on attitudes, see Sears and Funk ½1999Þ and thus diverge more from the mainstream if these origin values diverge more, which happens to be the case for excluded groups. But legal exclusion in and of itself does not seem to influence value heterodoxy of the first generation all that much. The reverse is true for children of immigrants, for which their status as a disadvantaged group has a substantially very large effect on how they relate to mainstream values. A more precise investigation of how legal disadvantage is associated with value heterodoxy therefore needs to focus on the children of immigrants. This is what we do in the next analytical step. In order to answer these questions, we need to look at the absolute values that an individual holds rather than the degree of heterodoxy. Otherwise a person who has moved from a distant cultural origin toward the mainstream ðacculturationÞ would be observationally equivalent to a person who has moved from not-so-distant cultural origins in the other direction-further away from the mainstream, as in an oppositional culture move. We therefore now define the dependent variable as the score of each individual on a particular value scale. The second difference with regard to the previous models is that we will now look at each value dimension separately. When summing over all four values, as we did so far, we might overlook that an assimilatory move on one value dimension might be canceled out by a dissimilatory move on another value dimension.
Third, we now include only immigrants in the sample ðsince we are no longer interested in divergence from the mainstreamÞ, and we now use a cross-nested design: children of immigrants are nested into both their country of destination value distribution and that of the immigrant generation. This cross-nested design will allow us to test how far an individual's absolute values are relatively more influenced by her origins or by the destination country. The varying slope of these two group-level variables will be explained by a dummy variable, indicating whether a group is legally disadvantaged or not.
To calculate origin values, we referenced all immigrants from a particular country of origin who resided in an ESS country, as long as we found more than 20 individuals. For example, we calculated the value distribution among all Algerian first-generation migrants we found in the surveys of the countries that administered the ESS. This allows us to consider immigrant groups from around the world.
For robustness purposes, we also calculated the value distribution of those countries of origin that had themselves administered the ESS ðthus, e.g., of all Turks in TurkeyÞ, restricting the sample to migrants from such countries ðsimilar to Models 2 and 4 in Table 2Þ . These fully representative ESS samples allow us to calculate origin values that are not influenced by first-generation acculturation processes, but they do not, on the other hand, take selectivity into account: emigrants might hold values different from the values of those who stayed behind. We found that results based on these two different measurements of origin values were substantially very similar. Below, we present the models that include the values of all members of the parent generation as a reference point and show the ESS-only models in table A2 in the appendix.
A Typology of Acculturation Outcomes
To prepare the empirical analysis, we need to first clarify how the two value distributions-of parent origins and countries of settlement-influence the values of the children of immigrants and how such influences relate to the various theoretical expectations. In the language of magnetic fields, the value universes of both origins and countries of settlement can be described as attractors, making children of immigrants adopt these values, or repellers, pushing an individual away from them and making her own values more dissimilar. As a third possibility, an individual's values might not bear any relationship to a particular value universe and thus be neither "attracted" nor "repelled" by it. Cross-tabulating attraction, rejection, and nonrelationships, we arrive at a typology of nine possible paths of acculturation, five of which have so far been discussed in the literature ðsee fig. 3Þ .
Straightforward acculturation-as foreseen by all three exclusion theories for nondisadvantaged groups-is defined as a positive ðattractionÞ effect of country of destination values and no effect of origin values: the immigrant ceases to be influenced by where she came from and is orienting herself toward the mainstream values of her new environment.
13 When both origin and destination country values are associated with an individual's values, this indicates a case of blocked acculturation:
14 she still retains parts of the value system of her origins but has already selectively acculturated to country of destination values. In contrast to straightforward acculturation, therefore, origin values still influence immigrant values. If no movement toward host country values can be noted while origin values are retained, this corresponds to a transnational mode of adaptation-as perhaps illustrated by someone whose everyday life is entirely confined to a diasporic enclave without taking much notice of what "mainstream values" could actually mean.
If neither origin nor destination country values are associated with a person's value orientation, she is not participating in the moral universe of the mainstream of either where she came from or where she landed. This is what we would observe if she creatively recombined locally available values of diverse cultural origins, as foreseen by hybridity theories discussed above. Finally, an immigrant or her children might also actively dissociate herself from the values of her origins and at the same time reject those of the destination country, which is what the literature calls an "oppositional culture":
15 the creation of a new universe of norms and values in opposition to those of origin and destination cultures alike.
We note that these five outcomes do not exhaust the space of potential outcomes, as the figure illustrates. There are four other possible combinations that have not been explored by the literature so far: dissociation from origin values combined with acculturation to destination values; dissociation from origins without any acculturation; rejection of destination values ðwhat one could call "dissimilation"Þ; and, finally, dissimilation combined with retention. Model 1 refers to the conservation variable. It represents a case of acculturation for both discriminated and nondiscriminated groups: the main effects, which refer to nondiscriminated groups, show that parent generation values have only a statistically weak association with the values held by an individual, while mainstream values work as a highly significant positive "attractor." Since none of the interaction effects are significant, discriminated groups' acculturation trajectories are indistinguishable from those of nondisadvantaged groups.
Results
Models 2 and 3 refer to openness and self-enhancement ðor individual achievementÞ variables. In the case of openness, nondisadvantaged groups and disadvantaged groups are both no longer affected by the values of the parent generation, but by those of the mainstream-indicating a case of acculturation. However, the interaction term between destination values and disadvantage is negative significant, indicating that disadvantaged groups assimilate less into mainstream values than do nondisadvantaged groups. This can be interpreted as another variant of blocked acculturation.
In the case of self-enhancement ðmodel 3Þ, we observe a more straightforward case of blocked acculturation for disadvantaged groups, while nondisadvantaged groups travel down the road of straight-line acculturation, as in the conservation dimension: there is no significant association with parent generation values for the nondiscriminated and a positive and significant sign for the coefficient of mainstream values. Now, however, the coefficient of one of the interaction effects is significant: the association with origin values is much stronger for disadvantaged groups and becomes statistically significant, while the association with mainstream values is not significantly different from that observed for nondisadvantaged groups.
Finally, model 4 with self-transcendence ðor altruismÞ as the dependent variable again represents a case of acculturation for both the excluded and nonexcluded children of immigrants. Though only weakly significant, there is a positive association with destination value patterns ðthe main effect referring to nondisadvantaged groupsÞ. The interaction effects with a disadvantaged status are not significant, indicating that disadvantaged groups are no different from others.
These results suggest quite unequivocally that disadvantaged groups of immigrants' children diverge from mainstream values, as revealed in table 2, because they do not advance as much toward full value acculturation as do nondiscriminated-against groups in the domains of individual achievement values and openness to change. There is no indication, other the other hand, of an explicit rejection of either destination or origin country values-no indication, in other words, that an oppositional culture mechanism could be at work. Also remarkable, from a more theoretical point of view, is that none of the other logically possible trajectories-the empty cells in figure 3 actually emerge.
For robustness purposes, we ran all models shown in table 3 with the alternative coding of origin values mentioned above. Rather than taking all first-generation migrants from a particular country across the entire ESS survey as a reference point, we can also refer to the average values in countries of origin where the ESS was administered, thus reducing the sample to 29 immigrant groups. The results are substantially very similar ðsee table A2Þ, though for openness values we now find that both discriminated and nondiscriminated groups do assimilate in similar ways ðthe interaction term is no longer significant; with regard to self-transcendence, discriminated groups do so even more than nondiscriminated groups, indicating a tendency toward hyperacculturationÞ. This is reassuring because one might have been concerned that the entire parent generation residing in a variety of countries is not representative for the origin values to which immigrants' children react ðnot the least because of possible acculturation processes to different country-specific value universesÞ or that we need to disentangle their relationship with their parents' values from that with the values of their country of origin with which they might be familiar through frequent return visits or contacts with grandparents.
Who Blocks Acculturation and How? Some Qualitative Evidence
How can we relate these findings to qualitative evidence? While we cannot offer a full-fledged triangulation with results of fieldwork specifically designed for this project, there is ample evidence in the published ethnographic literature of blocked acculturation processes. Most of the "blocking" appears to take the form of peer pressure from parents, siblings, extended family, and the community at large. In those milieus where upward social mobility is hampered through the lack of legal equality and equal chances on the labor market, the parents and peers of children of immigrants see no point in encouraging acculturation by investing in the cultural tools, normative orientations, and mastery of the behavioral scripts that dominate mainstream society.
A handful of examples should suffice: in the United States, social pressure to avoid Americanization is directed at the children and grandchildren of immigrants from Vietnam ðZhou and Bankston 1998Þ, Latin America ðChavez and French 2007Þ, and the Punjab ðGibson 1989Þ. Lindo ð1996Þ showed that Turkish adolescents in the Netherlands are under strong pressures to maintain the original value orientations held by parents and by other families from the same region of origin, through familiar mechanisms such as gossiping and the fear of losing "honor" that it produces ðfor Dutch Turkish girls specifically; see De Vries ½1995Þ. According to a group of ethnographers of the children of Turkish immigrants in Belgium, "People who deviate from what are considered Turkish norms and values are la-beled within the community as 'becoming a gavur' ðgavurlasmakÞ ½gavur meaning 'infidel' or 'becoming Belgian' ðverbelgenÞ, both of which are disapproving formulations. The existence and widespread use of the neologisms verbelgen and gavurlasmak in Dutch and Turkish respectively, illustrate that this pressure to resist assimilation is not a marginal phenomenon but a reality that many have experienced" ðVan Kerckem, Van de Putte, and Stevens 2012, p. 9Þ. Such group pressure to resist acculturation, as Van Kerckem et al. show for the Turkish Belgian case, is not entirely effective and tends to break down in the third generation. For the children of immigrants, individuals develop various strategies to cope with social control and conformity pressures, including leading a double life or openly choosing the path of nonconformism. On overage, our results suggest, this leads to a process in which acculturation toward mainstream values is proceeding, albeit at a slower rate than for nondiscriminated groups who are not the object of defensive social control pressures.
The ethnographic literature also points at a series of additional factors that influence acculturation processes: the level of group pressure within immigrant communities, which in turn depends on network density, group size, geographical concentration, and so on; gender differences with regard to the degree to which deviations from home country values and norms are tolerated; and so forth. Quantitative, survey-based research is obviously limited in its capacity to grasp these more fine-grained aspects and additional sources of variation in the process of acculturation. The ESS in particular does not have a sufficient number of immigrants to explore such regional variation within countries of destination or gender differences in acculturation trajectories. In turn, it is well suited to indicate broader patterns and to show that these hold for a larger number of cases than those an ethnographer can possibly focus on. 16 
CONCLUSION
The present study shows that most of the group-level variation in immigrant acculturation is associated with the legal treatment of immigrant groups-an important part of the "context of reception" highlighted by theories of segmented assimilation ðHaller, Portes, and Lynch 2011Þ and neoassimilationist alike ðAlba and Nee 2003Þ. While legally disadvantaged groups originally came from countries with more different value orientations than nondisadvantaged groups, the association between value difference and legal disadvantage remains strong for the children of immigrants 16 We note here that all results reported above hold up without Turkish migrant groups as well.
even when taking this into account. Distant linguistic or religious origins, including Islamic religious traditions, or conditions that facilitate transnational ties are not effective in understanding group-level differences in acculturation.
We showed that the effects of disadvantage are most clearly visible for children of immigrants, while the migrants themselves stay more closely tied to their country of origin value universe irrespective of whether or not they are legally disadvantaged-in line with a "cultural import" perspective. We also were able to make some progress in disentangling various possible mechanisms that could lie behind the association between value heterodoxy and disadvantage among the children of immigrants. We showed that the value heterodoxy of disadvantaged groups emerges because acculturation processes are blocked, and not because they would explicitly reject the values of their host societies: the host society value context is more relevant for them as compared to the value orientations of their parents' generation, but not quite to the degree as is the case for nondiscriminated groups.
A major limitation of our research stems from the cross-sectional nature of the ESS data set. We thus cannot offer a more dynamic analysis of the processes underlying value differentiation and show that the micro mechanisms foreseen by the exclusion approach in general and the blocked acculturation model more specifically are indeed empirically operating. Since value formation and change occur over the long run, an ideal research design would be a panel study that tracks individual value orientations ðincluding immigrants and their childrenÞ over the life course ðin an ideal world, over generationsÞ and that would then associate changes in value orientations to experiences of disadvantage and changes in levels of such disadvantage.
In the absence of such an ideal data set, future research might go beyond what we have been able to achieve here by generating more detailed data on the degree of exclusion or disadvantage at the immigrant group level ðor even at the individual levelÞ, perhaps not only focusing on the legalpolitical domain but taking into account everyday forms of discrimination and closure on the labor, housing, and relationship markets as well. To construct a comparative data set with over 300 immigrant groups in 23 countries would undoubtedly demand a considerable investment of resources but is in principle feasible.
Despite these limitations, the present study contributes important insights into an emerging literature in the sociology of immigration and beyond that refocuses on the role of values in shaping social action, including immigrants' incorporation trajectories. While much of that literature is indicating that group-specific values could possibly shape these trajectories, we have moved one step back from this line of reasoning and asked whether or not we can indeed observe group-specific values in the first place and how to explain such group-level divergences from mainstream values. Linking value differentiation among children of immigrants to processes of legal, institutionalized disadvantage, we offer a cautionary note to recent attempts to see cultural orientations as "exogenous" factors that shape social interactions underlying immigrant incorporation processes rather than being shaped by them. Since the variance compenents here are very close to zero, these results should be interpreted with care.
APPENDIX
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